

Listed Company Manual

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303.00 Corporate Governance Standards

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303A

General Application

Companies listed on the Exchange must comply with certain standards regarding corporate governance as codified in this Section 303A. Consistent with the NYSE's traditional approach, as well as the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, certain provisions of Section 303A are applicable to some listed companies but not to others.

Equity Listings

Section 303(A) applies in full to all companies listing common equity securities, with the following exceptions:

Controlled Companies -

A company of which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company need not comply with the requirements of Sections 303A(1), (4) or (5). A controlled company that chooses to take advantage of any or all of these exemptions must disclose in its annual meeting proxy that choice, that it is a controlled company and the basis for the determination. Controlled companies must comply with the remaining provisions of Section 303A.

Limited Partnerships and Companies in Bankruptcy -

Due to their unique attributes, limited partnerships and companies in bankruptcy proceedings need not comply with the requirements of Sections 303A(1), (4) or (5). However, all limited partnerships (at the general partner level) and companies in bankruptcy proceedings must comply with the remaining provisions of Section 303A.

Closed-End Funds -

The Exchange considers the significantly expanded standards and requirements provided for in Section 303A to be unnecessary for closed-end management companies given the pervasive federal regulation applicable to them. However, closed-end management companies must comply with the requirements set out in Sections 303A(6), (7) and (12)(b).

Other Entities -

Section 303A does not apply to passive business organizations in the form of trusts (such as royalty trusts) or to derivatives and special purpose securities (such as those described in Sections 703.16, 703.19, 703.20 and 703.21).

Foreign Private Issuers -

Listed companies that are foreign private issuers (as such term is defined in Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act) are permitted to follow home country practice in lieu of the provisions of this Section 303A, except that such companies are required to comply with the requirements of Sections 303A(6) (including the applicable commentary), (7)(a) and (c), (11) and (12)(b).

Preferred and Debt Listings

Section 303A does not generally apply to companies listing only preferred or debt securities on the Exchange. To the extent required by Rule 10A-3 under the Exchange Act, all companies listing only preferred or debt securities on the NYSE are required to comply with the requirements of Sections 303A(6) (including the applicable commentary), (7)(a) and (c), and (12)(b).

Effective Dates/Transition Periods

Companies that do not already have majority-independent boards will need time to recruit qualified independent directors, and companies with classified boards may need additional time to implement the new standards in a series of director elections. Accordingly, all listed companies will be required to comply with the standards in Sections 303A(1) and (2) no later than eighteen months following publication of SEC approval of these standards in the Federal Register. If a company has a classified board and a change would be required for a director who would not normally stand for election within the 18 month period, the company will have an additional year, or a total of 30 months after publication of SEC approval of Section 303A in the Federal Register, to effect the change in that director position.

Companies will have the same 18-month and 30-month periods described above to comply with the new qualification standards applicable to audit, nominating and compensation committee members. As a general matter, the existing audit committee requirements provided for in Section 303 continue to apply to NYSE listed companies pending the transition to the new rules.

Companies listing in conjunction with their initial public offering must comply within 24 months of listing. Companies listing upon transfer from another market have 24 months from the date of transfer in which to comply with any requirement to the extent the market on which they were listed did not have the same requirement. To the extent the other market has a substantially similar requirement but also had a transition period from the effective date of that market's rule, which period had not yet expired, the company will have at least as long a transition period as would have been available to it on the other market.

While the above time periods are needed to recruit directors, the Exchange believes that listed companies, IPOs and transfers can much more quickly implement the other requirements of Section 303A. The provision for a public reprimand letter set out in Section 303A(13) is effective upon publication of SEC approval of Section 303A in the Federal Register. The remaining requirements can also be implemented quickly. Accordingly, the following standards are effective six months from publication of SEC approval of Section 303A in the Federal Register:

- Executive sessions of non-management directors (subsection 3);
- Nomination and compensation committees with requisite charters (subsections 4 and 5);
- Audit committee with requisite charter (subsection 7);
- Corporate governance guidelines and code of business conduct and ethics (subsections 9 and 10);
- Foreign private issuer statement of significant differences from NYSE standards (subsection 11); and
- CEO certification of compliance with listing standards (subsection 12).

Once those six months are expired, we expect all newly listed companies, both IPOs and transfers, to have provided for these requirements by the time of listing on the Exchange.

1. Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.

Commentary: Effective boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest.

~~A company of which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company need not have a majority of independent directors on its board or have nominating/corporate governance and compensation committees composed of independent directors. A controlled company that chooses to take advantage of this exemption must disclose in its annual meeting proxy that it is a controlled company and the basis for that determination. However, all controlled companies must have at least a minimum three person audit committee composed entirely of independent directors, and otherwise comply with the audit committee requirements provided for in this Section 303A. — [Note to readers of this comparison: The exception for controlled companies has been moved to the section entitled “General Applicability” above.]~~

2. In order to tighten the definition of “independent director” for purposes of these standards:

(a) No director qualifies as “independent” unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company). Companies must disclose these determinations.

Commentary: It is not possible to anticipate, or explicitly to provide for, all circumstances that might signal potential conflicts of interest, or that might bear on the materiality of a director’s relationship to a listed company. Accordingly, it is best that boards making “independence” determinations broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances. In particular, when assessing the materiality of a director’s relationship with the company, the board should consider the issue not merely from the standpoint of the director, but also from that of persons or organizations with which the director has an affiliation. Material relationships can include commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial relationships, (among others). However, as the concern is independence from management, the Exchange does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to

an independence finding. Of course in no event can any current employee of the listed company be deemed independent of management.

The basis for a board determination that a relationship is not material must be disclosed in the company's annual proxy statement or, if the company does not file an annual proxy statement, in the company's annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC. In this regard, a board may adopt and disclose categorical standards to assist it in making determinations of independence and may make a general disclosure if a director meets these standards. Any determination of independence for a director who does not meet these standards must be specifically explained. ~~For example, a board might disclose its determination that affiliation with a customer whose business accounts for less than a specified percentage of the company's revenues is, as a category, immaterial for purposes of determining independence.~~ A company must disclose any standard it adopts. It may then make the general statement that the independent directors meet the standards set by the board without detailing particular aspects of the immaterial relationships between individual directors and the company (except where there is a presumption of non-independence, as described in the commentary to Section 303A(2)(b)). In the event that a director with a business or other relationship that does not fit within the disclosed standards is determined to be independent, a board must disclose the basis for its determination in the manner described above. This approach provides investors with an adequate means of assessing the quality of a board's independence and its independence determinations while avoiding excessive disclosure of immaterial relationships.

(b) In addition:

- ~~(i) No A director who is a former employee of receives, or whose immediate family member receives, more than \$100,000 per year in direct compensation from the listed company can be "independent" until five years after the employment has ended, other than director and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service), is presumed not to be independent until five years after he or she ceases to receive more than \$100,000 per year in such compensation.~~

Commentary: ~~A director who serves as an interim Chairman or CEO may be excluded from listed company's board may negate this presumption with respect to a director if the definition of a "former employee" board determines (and thus be deemed no independent immediately after his or her director dissents) that, based upon the relevant facts and circumstances, such compensatory relationship is not material. Any affirmative determination of independence made by the board in these circumstances must be specifically explained in the listed company's proxy statement, or, if the company does not file a proxy statement, in the company's annual report filed on Form 10-K with the SEC, and cannot be covered by a categorical standard adopted in accordance with the commentary to Section 303A(2)(a). Compensation received by a director for former service as as an interim Chairman or CEO ends. does not need to be considered as a factor by a board in determining independence under this presumption. If a person who received more than \$100,000 per year in direct compensation from a listed company dies or becomes incapacitated, the~~

presumption of non-independence applicable to his or her immediate family members will cease immediately upon such death or determination of incapacity.

- (ii) ~~No~~ A director who is, ~~or in the past five years has been,~~ affiliated with or employed ~~by~~ by, or whose immediate family member is affiliated with or employed in a professional capacity by, a (present or former) internal or external auditor of the company ~~(or of an affiliate) can be~~ is not “independent” until five years after the end of either the affiliation or the auditing relationship.
- (iii) ~~No~~ A director ~~can be~~ “independent” if ~~he or she~~ who is employed, ~~or in the past five years has been or whose immediate family member is employed,~~ part of an interlocking directorate in which ~~as~~ an executive officer of another company where any of the listed company serves on the compensation committee of another company’s present executives serves on that ~~concurrently employs the director~~ company’s compensation committee is not “independent” until five years after the end of such service or the employment relationship.
- (iv) ~~Directors with immediate family members in the foregoing categories are likewise subject to the five-year “cooling-off” provisions for purposes of determining “independence.”~~ A director who is an executive officer or an employee, or whose immediate family member is an executive officer, of another company (A) that accounts for at least 2% or \$1 million, whichever is greater, of the listed company’s consolidated gross revenues, or (B) for which the listed company accounts for at least 2% or \$1 million, whichever is greater, of such other company’s consolidated gross revenues, in each case is not “independent” until five years after falling below such threshold.

Commentary: Employment of a family member in a non-officer position does not preclude a board from determining that a director is independent. Such employment arrangements are common and do not present a categorical threat to director independence. In addition, if an executive officer dies or becomes incapacitated, his or her immediate family members may be classified as independent immediately after such death or determination of incapacity, provided that they themselves are otherwise independent. General Commentary to Section 303A(2)(b): An “immediate family member” includes a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-in-law, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home.

Transition Rule. During the five years immediately following [insert the effective date of this listing standard], each five year “look back” period referenced in sub-paragraphs (b)(i) through (b)(iv) shall instead be the period since [insert effective date of this listing standard]. For example, if a director received in excess of \$100,000 per year in direct compensation from a listed company during the year prior to [insert effective date of this listing standard], there will be no required presumption that the director is not independent unless such compensatory relationship extended past [insert effective date of this listing standard].

- 3. To empower non-management directors to serve as a more effective check on management, the non-management directors of each company must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without management.**

Commentary: To promote open discussion among the non-management directors, companies must schedule regular executive sessions in which those directors meet without management participation. (“Non-management” directors are all those who are not company officers (as that term is defined in Rule 16a-1(f) under the Securities Act of 1933), and includes such directors who are not independent by virtue of a material relationship, former status or family membership, or for any other reason.) Regular scheduling of such meetings is important not only to foster better communication among non-management directors, but also to prevent any negative inference from attaching to the calling of executive sessions. There need not be a single presiding director at all executive sessions of the non-management directors. If one director is chosen to preside at these meetings, his or her name must be disclosed in the annual proxy statement or, if the company does not file an annual proxy statement, in the company’s annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC. Alternatively, a company may disclose the procedure by which a presiding director is selected for each executive session. For example, a company may wish to rotate the presiding position among the chairs of board committees. In order that interested parties may be able to make their concerns known to the non-management directors, a company must disclose a method for such parties to communicate directly and confidentially with the presiding director or with the non-management directors as a group. That method can follow the same process established for communications to the audit committee required by Section 303A(7)(c)(ii).

- 4. (a) Listed companies must have a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent directors.**
 - (b) The nominating/corporate governance committee must have a written charter that addresses:**
 - (i) the committee’s purpose – which, at minimum, must be to: identify individuals qualified to become board members, and to select, or to recommend that the board select, the director nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders; and develop and recommend to the board a set of corporate governance principles applicable to the corporation;**
 - (ii) the committee’s goals and responsibilities – which must reflect, at minimum, the board’s criteria for selecting new directors, and oversight of the evaluation of the board and management; and**

(iii) an annual performance evaluation of the committee.

Commentary: A nominating/corporate governance committee is central to the effective functioning of the board. New director and board committee nominations are among a board's most important functions. Placing this responsibility in the hands of an independent nominating/corporate governance committee can enhance the independence and quality of nominees. The committee is also responsible for taking a leadership role in shaping the corporate governance of a corporation.

If a company is legally required by contract or otherwise to provide third parties with the ability to nominate directors (for example, preferred stock rights to elect directors upon a dividend default, shareholder agreements, and management agreements), the selection and nomination of such directors need not be subject to the nominating committee process.

The nominating/corporate governance committee charter should also address the following items: committee member qualifications; committee member appointment and removal; committee structure and operations (including authority to delegate to subcommittees); and committee reporting to the board. In addition, the charter should give the nominating/corporate governance committee sole authority to retain and terminate any search firm to be used to identify director candidates, including sole authority to approve the search firm's fees and other retention terms.

Boards may allocate the responsibilities of the nominating/corporate governance committee, ~~and the compensation committee described in subsection 5 hereof~~ to committees of their own denomination, provided that the committees are composed entirely of independent directors. Any such committee must have a published committee charter. To avoid any confusion, note that the audit committee functions specified in subsection Section 303A(7) hereof as belonging to the audit committee may not be allocated to a different committee. ~~As, other than as noted in subsection 1 of this the General Commentary to Section 303A, controlled companies need not comply with the requirements of this subsection 4.(7).~~

5. (a) **Listed companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.**
- (b) **The compensation committee must have a written charter that addresses:**
 - (i) **the committee's purpose – which, at minimum, must be to discharge the board's responsibilities relating to compensation of the company's executives, and to produce an annual report on executive compensation for inclusion in the company's proxy statement, or, if the company does not file a proxy statement, in the company's annual report filed on Form 10-K with the SEC, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations;**
 - (ii) **the committee's duties and responsibilities – which, at minimum, must be to:**
 - (A) **review and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation, evaluate the CEO's performance in light of those goals and objectives, and set have sole authority to determine the CEO's compensation level based on this evaluation. ~~;~~ and**

(B) make recommendations to the board with respect to non-CEO compensation, incentive-compensation plans and equity-based plans; and

(iii) an annual performance evaluation of the compensation committee.

Commentary: In determining the long-term incentive component of CEO compensation, the committee should consider the company's performance and relative shareholder return, the value of similar incentive awards to CEOs at comparable companies, and the awards given to the listed company's CEO in past years. To avoid confusion, note that the compensation committee is not precluded from approving awards (with theor without ratification of the board) as may be required to comply with applicable tax laws (i.e., Rule 162(m)).

The compensation committee charter should also address the following items: committee member qualifications; committee member appointment and removal; committee structure and operations (including authority to delegate to subcommittees); and committee reporting to the board.

Additionally, if a compensation consultant is to assist in the evaluation of director, CEO or senior executive compensation, the compensation committee charter should give that committee sole authority to retain and terminate the consulting firm, including sole authority to approve the firm's fees and other retention terms.

As noted in subsection 1 of this

Boards may allocate the responsibilities of the compensation committee to committees of their own denomination, provided that the committees are composed entirely of independent directors. Any such committee must have a published committee charter. To avoid any confusion, note that the audit committee functions specified in Section 303A, controlled companies need not comply with the requirements of this subsection 5.(7) may not be allocated to a different committee, other than as noted in the General Commentary to Section 303A(7).

6. Add to the "independence" requirement for audit committee membership the requirement that director's fees are the only compensation an audit committee member may receive from the company requirements of Rule 10A-3(b)(1) under the Exchange Act, subject to the exemptions provided for in Rule 10A-3(c).

Commentary: ~~The Exchange will continue to require each company to have a minimum three person audit committee composed entirely of independent directors. Each member of the committee must be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company's board in its business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the company's board interprets such qualification in its business judgment.~~

Commentary Applicable to All Companies: While it is not the audit committee's responsibility to certify the company's financial statements or to guarantee the auditor's report, the committee stands at the crucial intersection of management, independent auditors, internal auditors and the board of directors. The Exchange supports additional directors' fees to compensate audit committee members for the significant time and effort they expend to fulfill their duties as audit committee members, but does not believe that any member of the audit committee should receive

any compensation other than such director's fees from the company. If a director satisfies the definition of "independent director" (~~asset provided out~~ in ~~subsection 2 of this~~ Section 303A(2)), then his or her receipt of a pension or other form of deferred compensation from the company for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service) will not preclude him or her from satisfying the requirement that director's fees are the only form of compensation he or she receives from the company.

An audit committee member may receive his or her fee in cash and/or company stock or options or other in-kind consideration ordinarily available to directors, as well as all of the regular benefits that other directors receive. Because of the significantly greater ~~time~~ commitment of audit committee members, they may receive reasonable compensation greater than that paid to the other directors (as may other directors for other ~~time-consuming~~ committee work). Disallowed compensation for an audit committee member includes fees paid directly or indirectly for services as a consultant or a legal or financial advisor, regardless of the amount. Disallowed compensation also includes compensation paid to such a director's firm for such consulting or advisory services even if the director is not the actual service provider. Disallowed compensation is not intended to include ordinary compensation paid in another customer or supplier or other business relationship that the board has already determined to be immaterial for purposes of its basic director independence analysis. To ~~eliminate avoid~~ any confusion, note that this requirement pertains only to audit committee qualification and not to the independence determinations that the board must make for other directors.

Commentary Applicable to All Companies Other than Foreign Private Issuers: Each member of the committee must be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company's board in its business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the company's board interprets such qualification in its business judgment. A board may presume that a person who satisfies the definition of audit committee financial expert set out in Item 401(e) of Regulation S-K has accounting or related financial management expertise.

Because of the audit committee's demanding role and responsibilities, and the time commitment attendant to committee membership, each prospective audit committee member should evaluate carefully the existing demands on his or her time before accepting this important assignment. Additionally, if an audit committee member simultaneously serves on the audit committee of more than three public companies, and the NYSE-listed company does not limit the number of audit committees on which its audit committee members serve, then in each case, the board must determine that such simultaneous service would not impair the ability of such member to effectively serve on the listed company's audit committee and disclose such determination in the annual proxy statement or, if the company does not file an annual proxy statement, in the company's annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC.

~~7.—(a) Increase the authority and responsibilities of the~~

~~7. (a) Each company is required to have a minimum three person audit committee, including granting it the sole authority to hire and fire composed entirely of independent auditors, and to approve any significant non-audit relationship with the independent auditors-directors that meet the requirements of Section 303A(6).~~

(b) The audit committee must have a written charter that addresses:

(i) the committee's purpose – which, at minimum, must be to:

(A) assist board oversight of (1) the integrity of the company's financial statements, (2) the company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, (3) the independent auditor's qualifications and independence, and (4) the performance of the company's internal audit function and independent auditors; and

(B) prepare the report ~~that~~required by the SEC's proxy rules requireto be included in the company's annual proxy statement, or, if the company does not file a proxy statement, in the company's annual report filed on Form 10-K with the SEC;

(ii) the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee ~~—which, at minimum, must be to:~~set out in Section 303A (7)(c) and (d); and

(iii) an annual performance evaluation of the audit committee.

(c) As required by Rule 10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and subject to the exemptions provided for in Rule 10A-3(c), the audit committee must:

(A) ~~i) directly appoint, retain, compensate, evaluate and terminate the company's independent auditors (subject, if applicable, to shareholder ratification).~~;

Commentary: In connection with this requirement, the audit committee must have the sole authority to approve all audit engagement fees and terms, as well as all significant non-audit engagements with the independent auditors. In addition, the independent auditor must report directly to the audit committee. This requirement does not preclude the committee from obtaining the input of management, but these responsibilities may not be delegated to management. The audit committee must be directly responsible for oversight of the independent auditors, including resolution of disagreements between management and the independent auditor and pre-approval of all non-audit services.

(ii) establish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints from listed company employees on accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters, as well as for confidential, anonymous submissions by listed company employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters;

(iii) obtain advice and assistance from outside legal, accounting or other advisors as the audit committee deems necessary to carry out its duties; and

Commentary: In the course of fulfilling its duties, the audit committee may wish to consult with independent counsel and other advisors. The audit committee must be empowered to retain and compensate these advisors without seeking board approval.

(iv) receive appropriate funding, as determined by the audit committee, from the listed company for payment of compensation to the outside legal, accounting or other advisors employed by the audit committee.

(d) In addition to the duties set out in Section 303(A)(7)(c), the duties of the audit committee must be, at a minimum, to:

(Bj) at least annually, obtain and review a report by the independent auditor describing: the firm's internal quality-control procedures; any material issues raised by the most recent internal quality-control review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or investigation by governmental or professional authorities, within the preceding five years, respecting one or more independent audits carried out by the firm, and any steps taken to deal with any such issues; and (to assess the auditor's independence) all relationships between the independent auditor and the company--;

Commentary: After reviewing the foregoing report and the independent auditor's work throughout the year, the audit committee will be in a position to evaluate the auditor's qualifications, performance and independence. This evaluation should include the review and evaluation of the lead partner of the independent auditor. In making its evaluation, the audit committee should take into account the opinions of management and the company's internal auditors (or other personnel responsible for the internal audit function). In addition to assuring the regular rotation of the lead audit partner as required by law, the audit committee should further consider whether, in order to assure continuing auditor independence, there should be regular rotation of the audit firm itself. The audit committee should present its conclusions with respect to the independent auditor to the full board.

(Cj) discuss the annual audited financial statements and quarterly financial statements with management and the independent auditor, including the company's disclosures under "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations--;"

(Dj) discuss earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies--;

Commentary: The audit committee's responsibility to discuss earnings releases as well as financial information and earnings guidance may be done generally (i.e., discussion of the types of information to be disclosed and the type of presentation to be made). The audit committee need not discuss in advance each earnings release or each instance in which a company may provide earnings guidance.

~~**(E) as appropriate, obtain advice and assistance from outside legal, accounting or other advisors.**~~

~~*Commentary:* In the course of fulfilling its duties, the audit committee may wish to consult with independent advisors. The audit committee must be empowered to retain these advisors without seeking board approval.~~

~~**(F(iv)) discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management--;**~~

Commentary: While it is the job of the CEO and senior management to assess and manage the company's exposure to risk, the audit committee must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which this is handled. The audit committee should discuss the company's major financial risk exposures and the steps management has taken to monitor and control such exposures. The audit committee is not required to be the sole body responsible for risk assessment and management, but, as stated above, the committee must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which risk assessment and management is undertaken. Many companies, particularly financial companies, manage and assess their risk through mechanisms other than the audit committee. The processes these companies have in place should be reviewed in a general manner by the audit committee, but they need not be replaced by the audit committee.

(Gy) meet separately, periodically, with management, with internal auditors (or other personnel responsible for the internal audit function) and with independent auditors.;

Commentary: To perform its oversight functions most effectively, the audit committee must have the benefit of separate sessions with management, the independent auditors and those responsible for the internal audit function. As noted herein, all NYSE-listed companies must have an internal audit function. These separate sessions may be more productive than joint sessions in surfacing issues warranting committee attention.

(Hvi) review with the independent auditor any audit problems or difficulties and management's response.;

Commentary: The audit committee must regularly review with the independent auditor any difficulties the auditor encountered in the course of the audit work, including any restrictions on the scope of the independent auditor's activities or on access to requested information, and any significant disagreements with management. Among the items the audit committee may want to review with the auditor are: any accounting adjustments that were noted or proposed by the auditor but were "passed" (as immaterial or otherwise); any communications between the audit team and the audit firm's national office respecting auditing or accounting issues presented by the engagement; and any "management" or "internal control" letter issued, or proposed to be issued, by the audit firm to the company. The review should also include discussion of the responsibilities, budget and staffing of the company's internal audit function.

(Ivii) set clear hiring policies for employees or former employees of the independent auditors; and

Commentary: Employees or former employees of the independent auditor are often valuable additions to corporate management. Such individuals' familiarity with the business, and personal rapport with the employees, may be attractive qualities when filling a key opening. However, the audit committee should set hiring policies taking into account the pressures that may exist for auditors consciously or subconsciously seeking a job with the company they audit.

(Jviii) report regularly to the board of directors.

Commentary: The audit committee should review with the full board any issues that arise with respect to the quality or integrity of the company's financial statements, the company's

compliance with legal or regulatory requirements, the performance and independence of the company's independent auditors, or the performance of the internal audit function.

~~(iii) an annual performance evaluation of the audit committee.~~

~~Commentary: General Commentary to Section 303A(7)(d):~~ While the fundamental responsibility for the company's financial statements and disclosures rests with management and the independent auditor, the audit committee must review: (A) major issues regarding accounting principles and financial statement presentations, including any significant changes in the company's selection or application of accounting principles, and major issues as to the adequacy of the company's internal controls and any special audit steps adopted in light of material control deficiencies; (B) analyses prepared by management and/or the independent auditor setting forth significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection with the preparation of the financial statements, including analyses of the effects of alternative GAAP methods on the financial statements; (C) the effect of regulatory and accounting initiatives, as well as off-balance sheet structures, on the financial statements of the company; and (D) the type and presentation of information to be included in earnings press releases (paying particular attention to any use of "pro forma," or "adjusted" non-GAAP, information), as well as review any financial information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies.

~~General Commentary to Section 303A(7): To avoid any confusion, note that the audit committee functions specified in Section 303A(7) are the sole responsibility of the audit committee and may not be allocated to a different committee.~~

~~(e)(e) Each listed company must have an internal audit function.~~

~~Commentary: Listed companies must maintain~~ an internal audit function.~~Commentary: This requirement does not necessarily mean that a to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing assessments of the company must establish a separate's risk management processes and system of internal audit department or dedicate employees to the task on a full-time basis; it is enough for a company to have in place an appropriate control process for reviewing and approving its internal transactions and accounting.~~ A company may choose to outsource this function to a firm other than its independent auditor.

8. Reserved.

9. Listed companies must adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines.

Commentary: No single set of guidelines would be appropriate for every company, but certain key areas of universal importance include director qualifications and responsibilities, responsibilities of key board committees, and director compensation. Given the importance of corporate governance, each listed company's website must include its corporate governance guidelines, and the charters of its most important committees (including at least the audit, and if applicable, compensation and nominating committees) and the company's code of business conduct and ethics (see subsection 10 below). Each company's annual report must state that the foregoing information is available on its website, and that the information is available in print to any shareholder who requests it. Making this information publicly available should promote better investor understanding of the company's policies and procedures, as well as more conscientious adherence to them by directors and management.

The following subjects must be addressed in the corporate governance guidelines:

- **Director qualification standards.** These standards should, at minimum, reflect the independence requirements set forth in [subsections Sections 303A\(1\) and \(2-of this Section 303A\)](#). Companies may also address other substantive qualification requirements, including policies limiting the number of boards on which a director may sit, and director tenure, retirement and succession.
- **Director responsibilities.** These responsibilities should clearly articulate what is expected from a director, including basic duties and responsibilities with respect to attendance at board meetings and advance review of meeting materials.
- **Director access to management and, as necessary and appropriate, independent advisors.**
- **Director compensation.** Director compensation guidelines should include general principles for determining the form and amount of director compensation (and for reviewing those principles, as appropriate). The board should be aware that questions as to directors' independence may be raised when directors' fees and emoluments exceed what is customary. Similar concerns may be raised when the company makes substantial charitable contributions to organizations in which a director is affiliated, or enters into consulting contracts with (or provides other indirect forms of compensation to) a director. The board should critically evaluate each of these matters when determining the form and amount of director compensation, and the independence of a director.
- **Director orientation and continuing education.**
- **Management succession.** Succession planning should include policies and principles for CEO selection and performance review, as well as policies regarding succession in the event of an emergency or the retirement of the CEO.
- **Annual performance evaluation of the board.** The board should conduct a self-evaluation at least annually to determine whether it and its committees are functioning effectively.

10. Listed companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors or executive officers.

Commentary: No code of business conduct and ethics can replace the thoughtful behavior of an ethical director, officer or employee. However, such a code can focus the board and management on areas of ethical risk, provide guidance to personnel to help them recognize and deal with ethical issues, provide mechanisms to report unethical conduct, and help to foster a culture of honesty and accountability.

Each code of business conduct and ethics must require that any waiver of the code for executive officers or directors may be made only by the board or a board committee and must be promptly disclosed to shareholders. This disclosure requirement should inhibit casual and perhaps questionable waivers, and should help assure that, when warranted, a waiver is accompanied by

appropriate controls designed to protect the company. It will also give shareholders the opportunity to evaluate the board's performance in granting waivers.

Each code of business conduct and ethics must also contain compliance standards and procedures that will facilitate the effective operation of the code. These standards should ensure the prompt and consistent action against violations of the code. [Each listed company's website must include its code of business conduct and ethics. Each company's annual report must state that the foregoing information is available on its website, and that the information is available in print to any shareholder who requests it.](#)

Each company may determine its own policies, but all listed companies should address the most important topics, including the following:

- **Conflicts of interest.** A “conflict of interest” occurs when an individual’s private interest interferes in any way – or even appears to interfere – with the interests of the corporation as a whole. A conflict situation can arise when an employee, officer or director takes actions or has interests that may make it difficult to perform his or her company work objectively and effectively. Conflicts of interest also arise when an employee, officer or director, or a member of his or her family, receives improper personal benefits as a result of his or her position in the company. Loans to, or guarantees of obligations of, such persons are of special concern. The company should have a policy prohibiting such conflicts of interest, and providing a means for employees, officers and directors to communicate potential conflicts to the company.
- **Corporate opportunities.** Employees, officers and directors should be prohibited from (a) taking for themselves personally opportunities that are discovered through the use of corporate property, information or position; (b) using corporate property, information, or position for personal gain; and (c) competing with the company. Employees, officers and directors owe a duty to the company to advance its legitimate interests when the opportunity to do so arises.
- **Confidentiality.** Employees, officers and directors should maintain the confidentiality of information entrusted to them by the company or its customers, except when disclosure is authorized or legally mandated. Confidential information includes all non-public information that might be of use to competitors, or harmful to the company or its customers, if disclosed.
- **Fair dealing.** Each employee, officer and director should endeavor to deal fairly with the company’s customers, suppliers, competitors and employees. None should take unfair advantage of anyone through manipulation, concealment, abuse of privileged information, misrepresentation of material facts, or any other unfair-dealing practice. [Companies may write their codes in a manner that does not alter existing legal rights and obligations of companies and their employees, such as “at will” employment arrangements.](#)
- **Protection and proper use of company assets.** All employees, officers and directors should protect the company’s assets and ensure their efficient use. Theft, carelessness and waste have a direct impact on the company’s profitability. All company assets should be used for legitimate business purposes.

- **Compliance with laws, rules and regulations (including insider trading laws).** The company should proactively promote compliance with laws, rules and regulations, including insider trading laws. Insider trading is both unethical and illegal, and should be dealt with decisively.
- **Encouraging the reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior.** The company should proactively promote ethical behavior. The company should encourage employees to talk to supervisors, managers or other appropriate personnel when in doubt about the best course of action in a particular situation. Additionally, employees should report violations of laws, rules, regulations or the code of business conduct to appropriate personnel. To encourage employees to report such violations, the company must ensure that employees know that the company will not allow retaliation for reports made in good faith.

11. Listed foreign private issuers must disclose any significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards.

Commentary: ~~Both SEC rules and NYSE policies have long recognized that foreign private issuers differ from domestic companies in the regulatory and disclosure regimes and customs they follow, and that it is appropriate to accommodate those differences. For this reason, the NYSE for many years has permitted listed non-U.S. companies to follow home-country practices with respect to a number of corporate governance matters, such as the audit committee requirement and the NYSE shareholder approval and voting rights rules. While the NYSE will continue to respect different approaches, listed foreign~~ Foreign private issuers must make their U.S. investors aware of the significant ways in which their home-country practices differ from those followed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards. However, ~~listed~~ foreign private issuers are not required to present a detailed, item-by-item analysis of these differences. Such a disclosure would be long and unnecessarily complicated. Moreover, this requirement is not intended to suggest that one country's corporate governance practices are better or more effective than another. The Exchange ~~simply~~ believes that U.S. shareholders should be aware of the significant ways that the governance of a listed foreign private issuer differs from that of a U.S. listed company. The Exchange underscores that what is required is a brief, general summary of the significant differences, not a cumbersome analysis.

Listed foreign private issuers may provide this disclosure either on their web site (provided it is in the English language and accessible from the [U.S.-United States](#)) and/or in their annual report as distributed to shareholders in the [U.S.-United States in accordance with Sections 103.00 and 203.01 of the Listed Company Manual](#) (again, in the English language). If the disclosure is only made available on the web site, the annual report shall so state and provide the web address at which the information may be obtained.

12. (a) Each listed company CEO must certify to the NYSE each year that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate governance listing standards.

Commentary: The CEO's annual certification to the NYSE that, as of the date of certification, he or she is unaware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate governance listing standards will focus the CEO and senior management on the company's compliance with the listing standards. Both this certification to the NYSE, and any CEO/CFO certifications required

to be filed with the SEC regarding the quality of the company's public disclosure, must be disclosed in the listed company's annual report to shareholders or, if the company does not prepare an annual report to shareholders, in the companies annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC.

(b) Each listed company CEO must promptly notify the NYSE after any executive officer of the listed company becomes aware of any material non-compliance with any applicable provisions of this Section 303(A).

13. 13.—The NYSE may issue a public reprimand letter to any listed company that violates **ana** NYSE listing standard.

Commentary: Suspending trading in or delisting a company can be harmful to the very shareholders that the NYSE listing standards seek to protect; the NYSE must therefore use these measures sparingly and judiciously. For this reason it is appropriate for the NYSE to have the ability to apply a lesser sanction to deter companies from violating its corporate governance (or other) listing standards. Accordingly, the NYSE may issue a public reprimand letter to a company that it determines has violated **ana** NYSE listing standard. For companies that repeatedly or flagrantly violate NYSE listing standards, suspension and delisting remain the ultimate penalties. For clarification, this lesser sanction is not intended for use in the case of companies that fall below the financial and other continued listing standards provided in Chapter 8 of the Listed Company Manual. The processes and procedures provided for in Chapter 8 **will continue to** govern the treatment of companies falling below those standards.

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